Author:
Anastasiya Kazakova, Cyber Diplomacy Knowledge Fellow, DiploFoundation
In 2017 Richard Haass called for a new world order 2.0 that is based on ‘sovereign obligation’, the notion that sovereign states have not just rights, but also obligations to others. He reaffirmed that ‘globalisation is here to stay’, a view that, in 2025, no longer seems unquestionable.
For years, globalisation was seen as an inevitable trend – it connected economies, industries, governance systems, and people across the globe. This increasing interdependence was anticipated to lead to a more collaborative and unified international order. And indeed, it did – at least for a time. However, in recent years, there has been a notable rise in articles asking if globalisation is over or under threat. We are certainly witnessing the re-emergence of a stronger, nation-state-based international order. Key examples include (but are not limited to) Brexit, the approaches of countries like China and Russia to increase national sovereignty over internet segments within their borders, the current US administration’s ‘America First’ policy, which seem to prioritise bilateral relations with nation-states while delaying engagement with regional actors such as the EU, and the evident crisis facing many international systems, which are either being neglected or are calling for significant reform.
This shift, which we can refer to as the new rise of the Westphalian System, is reshaping geopolitics and influencing the governance of technology and cyberspace.
Why is it important?
As states – particularly the most influential ones – increasingly prioritise national sovereignty over global governance models, international cooperation in key digital areas is becoming more fractured. Agreements on cybersecurity, data security, and digital trade, which rely on shared rules and standards, are increasingly shaped by national interests rather than collective global frameworks. This shift leads to a more fragmented landscape, where differing regulations and priorities create challenges for international coordination and security.
This inevitably raises questions about the relevance and effectiveness of existing processes and normative frameworks, including non-binding cyber norms for responsible state behavior in cyberspace. Such uncertainties place a greater burden on key stakeholders, including the private sector and the technical community, who are expected to contribute to the implementation of these principles but may find the process increasingly difficult in a fractured political and economic landscape.
Meanwhile, as economic and digital tools are weaponised – through sanctions, export controls, surveillance, and cyber sovereignty laws and policies – geopolitical power dynamics are shifting. In this polarised environment, stakeholders face a fundamental challenge: how can common threats be addressed when trust and cooperation between states are becoming eroded? Which governance mechanisms, platforms, and tools can be used by responsible actors to facilitate the meaningful dialogue in discussing these common threats and risks?
What is the new rise of the Westphalian system?
To understand the transformation occurring in today’s international order, we first need to clarify what we mean by ‘new rise of the Westphalian system’. The term draws inspiration from the Peace of Westphalia treaties in 1648, which marked the end of the Thirty Years’ War in Europe and established the modern notion of the nation-state. In essence, this system recognised the sovereignty of nation-states and granted them control over their own territory, governance, and external relations. From today’s perspective, the current rise of the Westphalian system refers to a renewed emphasis on national sovereignty and self-determination, with states regaining control over their affairs and increasingly favoring national approaches over international systems. In areas such as cybersecurity, tech regulation, and AI, we are particularly witnessing the growth of fragmented governance structures, where major powers are developing their own rules or forming competing blocs.
At the same time, rather than a strict return to classical Westphalian principles, we are likely seeing a modified Westphalianism – a hybrid model where sovereignty remains central but operates in an interconnected world where states use economic tools, cyber controls, and strategic alliances to assert power. It’s neither a full rejection of globalisation nor a complete return to national sovereignty. Instead, it represents a recalibration – a shift toward a hybrid order where sovereignty and interdependence are being renegotiated, not replaced. In this new framework, national interests and aspirations to assert greater sovereignty in tech and digital affairs are prioritised over international (universal) governance models.
It is interesting that thirty years ago, despite the growing forces of globalisation in the 1990s, Stephen D. Krasner already pointed out that there has never been a ‘golden age’ for the Westphalian state. The system has always faced challenges in international relations, with its influence growing in waves. Principles such as non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries often serve as reference points, but they are not always followed or enforced. Nevertheless, current trends in global order seem to reflect emerging new tendencies.
What are the key trends demonstrating the return of the stronger nation-state order?
The shift away from globalisation towards stronger national policies is especially evident through, at least, three developments.
Firstly, growing multipolarity and, at the same time, geopolitical polarisation, is increasingly undermining the effectiveness of international organisations, as they struggle to maintain universal relevance in the face of rising inter-state conflicts and tensions. The comeback of major actors (e.g. Russia, China), following the unilateral hegemony of the USA, along with the rise of new players (India, Brazil, South Africa, Iran, Israel, Turkey, etc.), is creating an order where power is more distributed, and sovereignty-based diplomacy plays a larger role. The challenges for international organisations are evident in the paralysis of the WTO dispute resolution system, the imposition of national sanctions against the International Criminal Court (ICC), and the withdrawal of certain states from UN bodies such as the WHO and the Human Rights Council. The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) has largely been absent as a platform and a regional actor in peace negotiations during the Russia–Ukraine war. Meanwhile, the rise of new political and security alliances further highlights this fragmentation. A clear example is AUKUS, a pact between the USA, the UK, and Australia, aimed at enhancing military technology collaboration within a select group of nations to counter China’s growing influence in the Indo-Pacific region. In contrast, the BRICS alliance, while lacking formal security commitments or substantial integration efforts, is often seen as a bloc of states that are dissatisfied with Western-dominated economic and political structures. Similarly, the growing polarisation between states and the rise of smaller alliances is evident in the tech sphere, particularly in artificial intelligence. This is reflected in the increasing number of AI summits organised by individual states or major tech companies, each promoting their own priorities and agendas.
Secondly, states are now seeking economic self-sufficiency in cyber to avoid being vulnerable to foreign pressure and, instead of global integration, nations are interested in building their own technological ecosystems. The era of the global and borderless internet is over – the once universal vision of an open internet is giving way to nationalised digital ecosystems, where governments exert increasing control over how data is used and where it is stored, how platforms should be run, and which online discourse is allowed or not. China’s Great Firewall controls online content, blocking foreign platforms. Russia’s RuNet is governed by recently adopted laws to ensure it functions independently from the global internet, reinforcing digital sovereignty. Further, we’re increasingly seeing a fragmented user experience online, where access to content varies based on geographic location. While this is often linked to techno-authoritarianism, it’s also common in liberal democracies (e.g. the different Netflix libraries in various countries). This fragmentation of the global internet is expected to grow, driven by emerging online safety regulations in the EU, Australia, the UK, and others as nations create their own rules for online content, data usage, and privacy.
States are now also competing in AI regulation, as mentioned earlier, developing conflicting approaches. The EU AI Act, a first-ever legal framework on AI, emphasises a human-centric approach, imposing strict obligations on high-risk AI systems, and banning social scoring systems like those used in China. In contrast, the USA follows an industry-led strategy, relying on voluntary guidelines and corporate governance rather than strict federal legislation. While the Biden Administration’s AI Executive Order 14110 stressed AI safety, it did not introduce regulatory measures as stringent as those in the EU. The US Vice President also recently cautioned Europe against overly strict AI and tech regulations. Meanwhile, China prioritises national security over user rights (as in the EU) or corporate interests (as in the USA), requiring government approval for generative AI models and mandating that AI aligns with ‘core socialist values’.
Some might argue that the recent UN resolution on AI and the convention against cybercrime stand out within this trend. However, the AI resolution is non-binding and does not fully reflect the real competition already unfolding between states and big tech companies. Meanwhile, the cybercrime convention is seen as a major success in international efforts, though it has been heavily criticised for its state-centric approach and emphasis on national sovereignty. It remains to be seen whether the convention will secure the required 40 ratifications and how it will be implemented in practice.
Thirdly, countries are actively prioritising domestic industries over global supply chains, leading to a rise in economic nationalism. The US CHIPS Act and the EU’s European Chips Act aim to reduce reliance on foreign semiconductor production, especially from China. Brexit highlighted the desire for national sovereignty over economic and political integration within the EU. Further, we are witnessing the weaponisation of interdependence, where nations use trade, tech, and finance as geopolitical tools. The list of examples continues to grow: the USA and the EU cut Russia off from SWIFT after the Ukraine invasion; China restricted rare earth metal exports to the USA; the USA threatened to gain control of Greenland because of the rare earth metal (as one of the reasons); the USA banned semiconductor exports to China, sanctioned Huawei and Kaspersky; Russia banned tech from ‘unfriendly nations’, Australia and South Korea banned the Chinese DeepSeek AI app. This list is unlikely to experience reduction.
Some might argue that these trends can be interpreted differently and as with every issue, there are multiple perspectives, as the world is rarely binary. For instance, some might say that supply chains remain interconnected, even in critical sectors such as semiconductors and energy. In addition, the rise of powerful big tech companies and the EU’s extraterritorial regulations (such as cybersecurity laws with a de facto transnational nature) suggest that globalisation’s features are still very much alive. However, the EU’s regulatory powers seem to be increasingly challenged, even by its like-minded partners. Even its closest allies are developing their own regulatory frameworks, instead of simply following the EU’s lead. While it’s true that many states – particularly emerging powers and smaller nations – rely on multilateral institutions for influence and legitimacy, even selectively, this doesn’t negate the larger trend set by major players towards selective adherence to established norms and institutions.
What risks does this shift introduce to cyberspace?
This shift certainly introduces some opportunities (e.g. boosting regional cooperation and allowing for policies and regulations that are more tailored to the unique geopolitical and cultural specifics of different regions). However, in the context of this piece, we would like to focus on the risks, as they could offer insights into potential problems that require further discussion.
In a world where national sovereignty is becoming more central, we’re witnessing clear effects in cyberspace. Discussions about ‘internet fragmentation’ or the ‘splinternet’ which started a few years ago, led to frequent opinions being rightly pointed out that without global standards, businesses will struggle with conflicting regulations. This will not only increase costs and inefficiencies, but could slow down technological progress and negatively impact security efforts. On top of that, users might experience higher prices or less access to tech products and services. Some also point out the rise of techno-nationalist policies targeting foreign companies and individuals, while allowing domestic ones to operate with little scrutiny or regulation, even though both may engage in harmful practices.
What often goes unnoticed is how addressing global challenges – such as cybersecurity and artificial intelligence – through fragmented, nationally-driven approaches may be doing more harm than good. This is evident in the current landscape of competing national AI policies and security strategies, which frequently exacerbate risks rather than mitigate them. The goal isn’t necessarily to establish a single, overarching international authority, but rather to cultivate genuine, inclusive global dialogue. Yet, this vision is increasingly at risk as nations and tech actors largely prefer to speak to like-minded actors and lose a capability to hear opposing views. This stifles dialogue and prevents balanced, comprehensive solutions to global challenges. When nations prioritise their own interests over multilateral cooperation, they not only miss out on diverse perspectives but also deepen global divisions, making it harder to achieve meaningful progress in addressing common challenges.
What diplomatic or policy responses could emerge from Geneva?
In 2018, Switzerland launched the Geneva Dialogue, an international process to discuss responsible behaviour in cyberspace. Geneva has long been a hub for international diplomacy, where competing voices come together to negotiate, debate, and find common ground. Known for hosting critical discussions on peace, security, and governance, Geneva provides a neutral space where dialogue remains possible even amid rising geopolitical tensions. This, too, was a historical moment, following the first failure of the UN cyber process in 2017, when states couldn’t reach consensus on a report addressing the risks of cyberwarfare and the application of international law to cyberspace.
Since then, the Geneva Dialogue has engaged over 100 organisations and individual experts from all regions. It is becoming a rare platform where voices from the USA, the EU, Russia, China, as well as from Asia-Pacific, including Australia, the Middle East, Africa, and Latin America, can regularly and meaningfully engage on common cyber risks (e.g. ICT supply chain risks or vulnerabilities in digital products) with the focus on exchanging views and learning from each other, rather than solely aiming to reach a consensus.
As the global system becomes more fragmented and state-driven, spaces for open, cross-regional dialogue between actors with competing interests are shrinking. Multilateral forums that once promoted cooperation are increasingly being replaced by smaller, like-minded groups. This is particularly concerning for technology and cybersecurity, where international collaboration is essential. In this landscape, the Geneva Dialogue stands out as a space where different perspectives can be heard and practical insights shared to help tackle shared challenges. The initiative is seen as a practical example to counterbalance growing nationalism in cyber and digital affairs, as well as to bridge the gap between national sovereignty and multistakeholder and multilateral engagement.
The results of these discussions are captured in the Geneva Manual, which reflects the views of non-state stakeholders on how to implement cyber norms and confidence-building measures that states have agreed upon at the UN level. The manual doesn’t just document areas where participating experts agree – it also highlights disagreements and nuances in how norms should be put into practice, whether through national laws, policies, or industry standards.
Geopolitical instability is adding new layers of complexity to international relations. Yet, paradoxically, states have never been bound together by so many common challenges. National efforts alone won’t be enough to address them. The international community needs spaces where alternative voices can be heard and respected – where dialogue is not just an option, but a necessity.
In the end, in a world that is increasingly multipolar and shaped by a wide range of actors, is there any real alternative to a dialogue to ensure the current instability doesn’t escalate into outright chaos?
